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CARNIVORE: WILL IT DEVOUR YOUR PRIVACY?
Perhaps you have written an e-mail that looks something like this:
"Dear David, Have you heard the horrible news? Robert has been picked up again for
cocaine. That's another parole violation for him, and I think we'll be losing him at work.
I will get back to you on that important project we talked about; I am going to New York
this weekend with Ben. Call me on my cell if you need me... (310) 555-2559. Calista"
Can you think of any reason justifying the FBI's access to this email? Assuming that
Calista is not under investigation and there is no warrant allowing the FBI to intercept
her communications, there simply is no compelling reason. Yet that is exactly what might
happen if the FBI's newest cybercrime battling machine, Carnivore, is "tapped" into
Calista's ISP.
Introduction
¶1          The Wall Street Journal broke the story of Carnivore a little more than a year ago1 and
since then there has been a swarm of controversy surrounding the program. One of the major
reasons for the controversy is that the general public has no firm understanding of the
capabilities of Carnivore. There is prodigious misinformation surrounding Carnivore, and the
FBI refuses (for proprietary reasons) to release the source code.2 
What is Carnivore?
¶2          From securities fraud to cyberterrorism, child pornography to espionage, electronic
communication has become a major avenue for criminal activity. In response, the FBI developed
Carnivore, a surveillance system that monitors electronic communication. With a court order or
lawful consent from the Internet Service Provider (ISP), the FBI can tap Carnivore into an ISP's
high-speed network. Aptly named Carnivore because of its ability to find the "meat," or criminal
activity, in Internet traffic, it can track a user's incoming and outgoing e-mails. Information
travels through the Internet in packets of binary code. In the case of e-mail, a single message is
broken down into several packets. Every packet contains duplicate information such as, among
other things, the address from which the e-mail was sent, the address to which it was sent, and
the subject line. Each packet also contains unique information - a section of the e-mail's content.
¶3          Filtering the ISP's network traffic, Carnivore "sniffs" binary code - streams of 0s and 1s
- looking for specific information. Detecting this information, Carnivore saves the packets of
communication associated with the subject. The rest of the network traffic continues its path,
unscathed by Carnivore. From the stored packets, Carnivore collects email content and
transactional information, such as the user address, source, destination, date, time, and duration
of the message.3 Carnivore makes the saved, filtered information available to FBI agents. When
the FBI attaches Carnivore to an ISP, it swims through a lake full of data searching for a very
particular fish.
¶4          Depending on whom you ask, Carnivore is either a sharpened spear aimed directly for
the target, or a giant net cast wide across the whole lake. The FBI champions Carnivore as a
surgical tool, superior to any commercially available "sniffer."4 Most commercial sniffers are
sufficient for network administration but lack the flexibility and precision to meet legal and
evidentiary requirements.
¶5          The FBI can tailor Carnivore's filtering system to collect only information authorized by
court order. Carnivore appends each collection by noting the filter configuration during that
search, for later reference by federal officials, a court, or defense counsel. Because the FBI can
tailor the filtering process to meet the specific parameters of a court order, Carnivore is more
flexible and effective than commercial sniffers. For example, if a pen register or trap and trace
order authorizes collection of only transactional and addressing information, Carnivore can filter
out any content of the message, including the subject line. Commercial sniffers are not
sophisticated enough to do that automatically and require human screening of collected content.
The FBI argues that this feature minimizes the involvement of FBI personnel in the filtering
process and protects the privacy of email users.5
¶6          Critics of Carnivore see it in a different light. The technology of e-mail messages, they 
point out, creates two major privacy concerns. First, does Carnivore give the FBI access to more 
information than it legally and constitutionally ought to see? While telephone systems clearly 
distinguish between transactional data (e.g., the number dialed) and substantive data (e.g., the 
conversation), e-mail systems are not as straightforward. As described above, an e-mail message 
gets divided into multiple packets of data, each containing a header (the date, time, addresses of 
the sender and receiver, and subject line) and a piece of the substantive content. Transactional 
and substantive data are inextricably mixed in these packets.6 To search substantive content, law 
enforcement officials must show probable cause and receive a court-ordered warrant. However, 
to search transactional information, law enforcement officials need no express authorization.
Thus, from a legal perspective, the data packet structure blurs the line between searches that
require a warrant and those that do not.
¶7          The FBI claims its complex filtering system enables them to avoid the collection of
unauthorized data. Despite assurances that the privacy of targeted users will be protected, it
would be easy for the FBI to overstep its mandate when conducting one of these searches.
Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, ACLU leader Barry Steinhardt cautioned,
"Carnivore gives the FBI far too much discretion and creates far too great a risk that it will burst
through the envelope of the Fourth Amendment and the congressionally imposed restraints."7
¶8          The second primary concern is that the e-mail of innocent users, not under
investigation, is subject to search. In a process known as "packet switching," e-mail data packets
separate from each other at the point of origin and travel independently to the destination e-mail
address, each packet taking the most efficient route at the time of transmittal. The entire message
reassembles at the destination.8 With many users sending messages at the same time, a large ISP
carries billions of data packets traveling simultaneously. To identify data for a targeted subject,
Carnivore must sniff every packet of data that travels on the network. In other words,
99.99999% of the information searched by Carnivore probably belongs to innocent users. The
technology of packet switching... means that the data of the innocent are inextricably mingled
with the data of the less innocent. A simple search to see if two people are e-mailing each other -
which can be approved without a search warrant - requires that Carnivore digest the private
correspondence of millions of people. This, of course, horrifies anyone concerned about Big
Brother.9 Privacy advocates are pushing for stricter controls on the use of Carnivore and for
requiring greater burdens of cause before the FBI may employ Carnivore.
The Scope of the 4th Amendment - Then, and Now
¶9          In Weeks v. United States, the Court holds that police violate a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights by entering his room without his permission or a warrant, and taking
possession of his property.10 After Weeks, evidence gathered in violation of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights is not admissible in court.11 
¶10          Katz v. United States expands Fourth Amendment protection to include much more 
than physical effects or mail.12 The Court holds that "[t]he 4th Amendment protects people, not 
places."13 A person's location is less relevant than their activity and subjective expectations. 
Technological innovations need Fourth Amendment protection to keep up with their rapid pace. 
The spirit of Fourth Amendment protection includes areas in which a person may have a
justifiable expectation of privacy.
¶11          The Katz Court developed a two-part test to determine whether an activity is protected
from search. The first part asks whether the individual has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy. The second part asks whether that expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. If both parts are answered affirmatively, Katz extends the
protection of the Fourth Amendment to the individual and activity at issue. After Katz, a
physical intrusion is not necessary for a search to violate the Fourth Amendment. A violation
can occur without police rifling through file cabinets or even entering a house, as long as there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy.
¶12          In United States v. Miller, the Court holds that there is no realistic expectation of
privacy in records that one willingly hands over to a bank.14 Bank customers know the records
will be handled by multiple employees, and perhaps seen by others. Checks, for example, are
routinely seen by several parties when used for business. While the records in question were
tangible items, Miller did not have possession of them at the time of their seizure. Having given
them to a third party like the bank, it became unreasonable for him to expect those records to
stay private.
¶13          Smith v. Maryland is the first case involving a pen register.15 A pen register records
the numbers dialed from a telephone. It records only numbers; it is unable to record the
substance of the conversation or whether the call connected. The Court holds that people do not
have a subjective expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. They are aware that
switching devices receive the numbers and connect them so that they can talk to the correct
person. Before the advent of mechanical switching devices, people gave the number to an
operator who physically connected the two parties via a switchboard. That, plus the itemized
phone bills that show every call a consumer has placed, illustrates that even if a person has an
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dials, society is not prepared to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.
¶14          Today, cases like Kyllo v. United States illustrate the judicial recognition that as our 
technology changes, so will our definition of "search."16 Even if the government refrains from 
physically touching a person's belongings, the Supreme Court has recognized that the taking of 
information may amount to the same kind of illegal search. "Where . . . the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."17 
¶15          Recent legislation in this area includes the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. §1001. This Act, know simply as "CALEA," requires that
communications providers implement certain technologies to enable them to assist law
enforcement agencies with authorized searches. However, CALEA does not apply to
"information services" like Internet Service Providers and email.18
Legal Analysis of Carnivore
¶16          Law enforcement agencies are not required to demonstrate probable cause when using
a pen register (to record a telephone subscriber's outgoing telephone numbers) or trap and trace
device (to record incoming telephone numbers).19 The FBI developed Carnivore in order to
emulate these devices for electronic communications.20 Relying on Smith and subsequent
congressional legislation, the FBI asserts that Carnivore's pen-mode should be subject to the
same minimal legal restraints as these other devices.21
¶17          In Smith, the Court holds that if law enforcement conduct infringes upon an actual and
reasonable expectation of privacy, it is a search under the Fourth Amendment.22 Applied to
telecommunications, the Court holds that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for the
digits of incoming and outgoing telephone calls.23 This holding "serves as justification for the
relatively low standard governing privacy protections for pen register and trap and trace
devices."24 As Alan Davidson, Staff Counsel for the Center for Democracy and Technology,
commented, this approval standard is "so low as to be nearly worthless."25
¶18          The FBI asserts that obtaining e-mail addresses using Carnivore's pen-mode is similar
to obtaining telephone numbers using a pen register or a trap and trace device.26 Because the use
of pen registers and trap and trace devices does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the FBI argues that the use of Carnivore's pen-mode does not constitute a
search.27 Evaluating Carnivore's constitutionality requires consideration of the FBI's analogy
that e-mail addresses are like telephone numbers. If the analogy is accurate, it may not be
necessary to examine the issue further; it is likely that the use of Carnivore will be found
constitutional. If this analogy is inaccurate, a higher legal standard must be followed and
Carnivore deserves a fresh review under Katz.
¶19          It is likely that the analogy is inaccurate because the operation of Carnivore in the 
online environment differs in significant ways from the operation of the pen register and trap
and trace device in traditional telephone systems. Although e-mail is often sent over telephone
lines, Carnivore is installed on an ISP's data network, not a telephone line. Information that
Carnivore can intercept is not limited to a suspected criminal's private telephone line, as with
traditional devices. Instead, Carnivore searches an ISP's entire network, which includes the
e-mail of thousands of the ISP's customers. This gives the FBI access to a much larger scope of
information than available from a single phone line. Intentional or accidental collection of
unauthorized communication by FBI personnel poses a potential threat to Fourth Amendment
rights. IIRTI's independent review of the Carnivore system revealed serious concerns about the
accountability of FBI agents using Carnivore. IITRI found that:
"it is not possible to determine who, among a group of agents with the password, may
have set or changed filter settings. In fact, any action taken by the Carnivore system
could have been directed by anyone knowing the Administrator password. It is
impossible to trace the actions to specific individuals." 28 
¶20          When the information-collecting capacity of the pen register is magnified by
thousands, as Carnivore does, the full potential to track who communicates with whom becomes
clear and such monitoring is seen for what it is: an invasion of privacy.
¶21          It is clear that the statutes governing the pen register and trap and trace device are
intended to cover the physical connection to a telephone line and not connection to the Internet.
Call routing information is separated from content in a telephone line, but the two are combined
in packets used for e-mail transmission over the Internet. As a result, the privacy concerns raised
in Carnivore are greater than those contemplated in Smith. First, the process by which individual
e-mail addresses and telephone numbers are collected is significantly different. Pen registers do
not copy the content of communications.29 "Neither the purport of any communication between
the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed
is disclosed by pen registers."30 Carnivore's pen-mode, on the other hand, first copies everything
that concerns the target, including the content of the target's communications, before each
character of the content is replaced with an "X."31 The content of communications clearly
carries a reasonable expectation of privacy; does another person have to read the content to
violate the sphere of "content?" What if, for example, private papers are taken, copied, and then
put back without ever having been read? Is this not an invasion of privacy? If one agrees that it
is, and the expectation of privacy in e-mail communication is reasonable, then it appears that
Carnivore violates the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶22          When replacing e-mail characters with Xs, Carnivore records the length of each field
in a target's e-mail, including the subject heading and the body of the message itself, as a string
of Xs.32 Knowledge of the entire length of an e-mail is analogous to knowledge of the entire
length of a telephone call, the latter being permissible under the pen-trap statute. However,
knowledge of the lengths of individual fields in an e-mail has no pen-trap equivalent.33 The
length of each individual field can, to a certain degree, reveal the nature of the communication.
Letters contained in an e-mail address also reveal more information than the digits in a telephone
number.34 Not only are the identities of the corresponding parties often revealed (e.g.,
"john.doe@email.com"), but e-mail addresses can also reveal an individual's affiliation with an
organization (e.g., "john.doe@law.duke.edu" or "john.doe@aclu.org").
¶23          Since a person's expectation of privacy is likely to increase as more information about
that person is collected, the potential for a "search" also increases.35 Moreover, Internet and
telephones naturally carry different expectations of privacy. The recording of transactional
information by telephone companies is a central reason the Supreme Court in Smith holds that
there is no expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed and received. In the context of the
Internet, there is no such recording of transactional information. ISPs merely provide an access
point to an untended pipeline.
¶24          Although the FBI tries to re-assure skeptics that Carnivore will not be used to retrieve
more information than is authorized because of its internal procedures, system safeguards, and
the potential for civil and criminal penalties stemming from its misuse, Fourth Amendment
principles require that the government's promises not be accepted without scrutiny.36 As Barry
Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU, has pointed out, the FBI has failed in recent years
to respect the agreements it has made with Congress to impose limitations on its own law
enforcement capabilities.37 
¶25          There is some indication that courts are moving toward a higher legal standard for
electronic communications. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently held that the Fourth Amendment protects dialed digits that convey content.38 This
decision supports the assertion that e-mail addresses convey content protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Taking this protection into account, Carnivore should be subject to a heightened
legal standard.
Conclusion
¶26          Returning very briefly to the e-mail excerpt discussed in the Introduction, one must
consider the reasons for the FBI's access to that email. Compelling reasons are difficult to find.
The writer obviously had an expectation of privacy, as she discussed her work, travel plans, and
even revealed her private phone number. Courts would likely find that her expectation is
reasonable, at least as reasonable as Katz's expectation of privacy in a public phone booth.
Should the FBI have access to all of this personal information simply because she used the word
"cocaine" in her email?
¶27          If Carnivore is tapped into her ISP, and programmed to search e-mail text for the word
"cocaine," it is not only possible that the FBI will read her e-mail, it is guaranteed. IIT's
independent tests proved that Carnivore can successfully search the text of e-mails for specified
keywords.39 Keep that in mind next time you share the news of the day, be it domestic terrorism
or celebrity drug use, with friends and family. The intended recipient may not be the only person
reading your e-mail.
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